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I. INTRODUCTION

You hack and slash your way across the field before you. Foes fall by
your sword, your arrows, and your magic. As you continue onward, you
stop by the bodies of the fallen to search for magical items and powerful
weapons. Finally, you find the sword you need.
Time and effort went into finding your new sword. No other player
may use your sword unless you consent. When you log off of the game and
walk away from your computer, the sword remains. It will be there when
you log back on.
Who owns the sword you found? Who owns the armor your character
wears? Who owns the virtual gold coins your character can access? Who
owns your character?
Virtual worlds are becoming more successful.' Worlds such as World
of Warcraft, EVE Online, and Second Life boast hundreds of thousands to
millions of subscribers all forming vibrant, online communities.2
Questions about the ownership status of the objects and characters in these
worlds arise as they become more and more popular and as the lines
between reality and virtual become increasingly blurred.'
First, this Article examines whether traditional common law property
rights can extend to the virtual objects found in virtual worlds. Virtual

1. See, e.g., Leila Abboud, Playingon Web: Dungeons & Dragons,WALL ST. J., Mar. 1,
2006, at A13A (describing briefly, how online games are "one of the fastest-growing parts of the
market for games played on personal computers .... "); Seth Schiesel, In a New Merger,Evidence
ofHow Much the Gaming World Has Changed,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2007, at E3 (discussing the
importance of Blizzard Entertainment, a Vivendi subsidiary, in the merger between Activision and
Vivendi; the name of the new company will be Activision Blizzard); Emily Steel, Avatars at the
Office-More Companies Move Into Virtual World 'Second Life' Ugly Bosses Can Be Models,

WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 2006, at BI (describing how more companies are building virtual offices in
Second Life; especially those in media related areas such as marketing).
2. World of Warcraft claims over 9 million subscribers. Press Release, Blizzard Entm't,
World of Warcraft Surpasses 9 Million Subscribers Worldwide (July 24, 2007), available at
http://www.blizzard.co.uk/press/070724.shtml. EVE Online claims over 200,000 subscribers. See
Press Release, EVE Online, CCP Announces EVE Online: Trinity Launch Date (Mar. 12, 2007),
availableat http://www.eve-online.com/pressreleases/default.asp? pressReleaselD=38. Second Life
claims 2 million "residents." Linden Lab, I'll See Your Million... andRaiseYou a Million, Second

Life Blog, Dec. 14,2006, http://blog.secondlife.com/2006/12/14/ill-see-your-million-and-doublethat. Some question Second Life's numbers. See Daniel Terdiman, Counting the Real "SecondLife'
population,CNETNEWS.COM, Jan. 3,2007, http://www.news. com/Counting-the-real-Second-Lifepopulation/2100-1043_3-6146943.html.
3. See Phil Lee, Opinion, LAwYER, May 16, 2005, at 14.
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objects are viewed through the lens of Pierson v. Post4 and the laws of
property acquisition, followed by an overview of policy arguments behind
extending property rights to virtual objects. The discussion concludes by
arguing that the common law of property should not be extended to virtual
objects.
Second, the effects of contract law on virtual objects and virtual worlds
are examined. Contract laws are compared to property laws in an effort to
understand confusions between obligation and ownership, and how these
confusions effect the debate. Finally, contract law is suggested as a better
paradigm for the allocation of resources in virtual worlds.
II. CAPTURING FoxES: THE ACQUISITION OF PROPERTY ("QuI PRIOR
EST TEMPORE POTIOR EST JURE.")

Property interests necessarily depend upon the acquisition of property.
Property rights in tangible objects are often acquired through the dominion
and control of objects. Pierson v. Post, one of the most well-known
property cases, deals with the rules of property acquisition through the law
of capture.'
In Pierson, the property in question was a fox.6 Post, a foxhunter,
complete with a retinue of hounds, flushed a fox on communal property.7
Post chased the fox for a considerable time until Pierson intervened by
killing and capturing the fox before Post.'
Both the majority and dissent in Pierson recognize the principal that
dominion over an object creates a property interest.9 The contention lies
in how to determine when this dominion and control occurs.' Three
solutions are proposed: a clear rule of capture," a resolution in accordance
with the custom of sportsmen, 12 and some form of recognition of Post's
effort in flushing and pursuing the fox, a "noxious beast" that is "hostem
humani generis" and better off dead.' 3 In the end, the clear rule of capture
prevails.' 4
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
See id. at 177-78.
Id. at 177.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 178; see also id. at 181 (Livingston, J., dissenting).
See id.
Id. at 179.
Id. at 180 (Livingston, J. dissenting).
Id. at 180-82.
Id. at 179.
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The fundamental consideration in Pierson is the level of control and
dominion either party possesses over the fox.' 5 Actual corporal possession
of the fox is sufficient for a property interest to attach, but bodily seizure
is not required.' 6 A pursuer may obtain a property interest in a fox by
mortally wounding the animal and continuing pursuit. 7 By doing so, the
pursuer has manifested an intent to possess the fox, he has deprived the fox
of its natural liberty, and "brought [the fox] within his certain control."'"
Piersonapplies the rule of capture in order to determine when someone
gains a property interest. 19 Pierson emphasizes dominion and control in
order to determine when property is captured.2" Two comparably classic
property cases highlight this approach: Ghen v. Rich2 ' and Ohio Oil Co. v.
Indiana.22
In Ghen v. Rich, a whaler used a bomb-lance to kill a fin-back whale.23
When killed in this manner, fin-back whales sink to the bottom of the
ocean, floating back to the surface after one to three days.24 The lances
used to kill the whales are marked by their owners in order to identify the
whale's killer.2" When the whale is found, the finder, in accordance with
custom, informs the whalers who then send the whale's killers, identified
by their lances, to retrieve the whale's bounty.26
The whale in Ghen was found washed ashore but, rather than return it
to its killer, the whale's finder sold the whale at auction.27 The whale's
killer sued for the property rights to the whale based upon whaling
customs.28 The district court sided with the whale's killer and awarded
damages in their favor.29
Ghen relies upon the dominion exercised over afera naturaethrough
mortal wounds.3 As Pierson did in Piersonv. Post,3 ' the whalers in Ghen
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

See id. at 178.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.at 178.
Id.
Ghen v. Rich, 8 F. 159, 160-62 (D. Mass. 1881).
Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 203-05 (1900).
Ghen, 8 F. at 160.
Id.at 159.
Id.at 160.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 160.
Id.at 162.
See id.at 160-61.
Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 178 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
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deprived the whale of its natural liberty through a mortal wound.32 Further,
the identification mark on the lance striking the blow manifested the
whalers' intent to possess the whale.33 The Ghen whalers, however, lacked
the ability to bring the whale into their certain control.34 Indeed, the record
indicates some whales are never located after their death, floating out to
open sea rather than washing ashore.35
Still, two of the three considerations in Piersonare present in Ghen: the
ability to exercise control through mortal wounds and the manifest intent
to possess the whale. 36 Additionally, Piersoncontemplates the possibility
that control may not occur as a result of interference by others.37
Remember, "actual bodily seizure is not indispensable to acquire right
'
to . .. [possession of] . . . wild beasts. 38
Ghen implies that the third
consideration in Pierson, bringing the wild beast within one's certain39
control, was met through the operation of commercial whaling customs.
Ohio Oil Co. applies the law of capture to fugitive resources rather than
wild animals.4" In Ohio Oil Co., the Court scrutinized the takings
implications of an Indiana statute prohibiting the owners of oil and gas
wells from allowing natural gas to escape into the air without capture in a
"proper receptacle."' The defendant, Ohio Oil Co., claimed the statute
violated the Fourteenth Amendment by depriving it of liberty and property
without due process of law.42
The Supreme Court analogizes natural gas and oil resources to animals
feroe naturoe.43 Animalsferoe naturoe,the Court explains, "belong to the
negative community" - subject to capture by all, and held in common by
the public, and in trust by the state.44 In contrast to animalsferoe naturoe,
the right to reduce fugitive resources to possession does not rest with the
public, but is exclusive to the owners in fee of the surface of the earth
circumscribing the gas or oil field. 45 The Court recognized, however, that
32. See Ghen, 8 F. at 160.
33. See id. at 160-61.
34. Id. at 159-60.
35. Id. at 160.
36. See id. at 160-61.
37. See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 178 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
38. Id.
39. See Ghen, 8 F. at 162.
40. See Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 203-05 (1900).
41. Id. at 191-92.
42. Id. at 200. Defendants also alleged denial of equal protection of the laws, but the Court
focused on the due process aspect of the claim. See id. at 199.
43. Id. at 204.
44. Id. at 208-09.
45. Id. at 209.
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property rights in oil or gas do not exist until the resources are captured
and reduced to possession.' While the owners in fee of the surface may
have a right to drill wells in order to attempt to capture the resources, these
owners do not have a property interest in the resources themselves until
successful capture occurs.4 7 In other words, the acquisition of fugitive
resources 48depends on the control and dominion one has over those
resources.

Common law in the United States has a long tradition of recognizing
the creation of a property interest beginning when one has dominion and
control over the property. 49 Dominion and control provides a clear method
of determining the property rights of individuals.50 Without this clear rule
for the acquisition of property, one runs into the difficulty Justice
Livingston experienced in his dissenting opinion in Pierson.5' Without a
clear rule, courts must determine how much effort, how much time, and
how close to capture and control a person must be in order to acquire a
property interest in a thing.5" Courts in the United States have consistently
avoided the difficulty of balancing each of these considerations by
adopting the clear rule of property acquisition found in Pierson.3

Il.

FIBER OPTIC FoxEs: DOMINION AND CONTROL OVER VIRTUAL
OBJECTS IN VIRTUAL WORLDS

Although the boundaries between reality and virtual reality are
blurring, virtual objects are not tangible. 4 It is tempting to analogize
46. Id.
47. Id. at 205.
48. See id. at 209.
49. See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 178 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (finding dominion and
control occurring when a fox hunter captures or mortally wounds and continues to chase the fox);
Ghen v. Rich, 8 F. 159, 162 (D. Mass. 1881) (finding dominion over a whale to occur when the
whale is killed and marked in accordance to whaling customs); Ohio Oil Co., 177 U.S. at 209
(possession of property rights in natural gas occur only after capture).
50. See Pierson, 3 Cai. R. at 178.
51. See id. at 180-81 (Livingston, J., dissenting) (Livingston struggled with the "knotty point"
of when a property interest should occur; after examining the various authorities cited by counsel
for either party, Livingston felt "great difficulty" in determining how much effort in chasing the
fox would grant a property interest).
52. Id.
53. See id. at 178 (applying a clear rule of capture to fox hunting); Ghen, 8 F. at 162
(applying a clear rule of capture to whale hunting through the use of whaling customs); Ohio Oil
Co., 177 U.S. at 209 (applying a clear rule of capture to the possession of fugitive resources).
54. Tangible, "1. [h]aving or possessing physical form; CORPOREAL. 2. [c]apable ofbeing
touched and seen; perceptible to the touch; capable of being possessed or realized." BLACK'S LAW
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virtual objects to tangible property since the goal of a virtual world is often
to simulate the real world as closely as possible. However, when we apply
the rules of property acquisition used for tangible property to virtual
objects in virtual worlds, the inherent differences between the two become
more clear.
Pierson,Ghen, and Ohio Oil Co. outline the law of property acquisition
through capture, with dominion and control of the property emerging as
the key to recognizing disputed rights in it." In Pierson, dominion and
control is exerted through mortal wounds or capture. 6 Dominion and
control is exerted in the same way in Ghen 7 Ohio Oil Co. finds dominion
and control asserted through the capture of fugitive resources.5
Unlike the fox in Pierson,the whale in Ghen, and the natural gas in
Ohio Oil Co., users of virtual worlds are unable to exert dominion and
control over virtual objects. The inability of a virtual world user to exert
dominion and control over a virtual object is an inherent and important
difference between a virtual object and its tangible counterpart. The
common law of property acquisition through capture cannot apply to
virtual objects because of this distinction.
When John Locke picks up an apple he has appropriated it "to
himself."59 The apple is not subject to the dominion and control of any
person other than Locke.6 ° Under the common law rule of capture, as long
as the apple is a fugitive resource, a resource existing in the commons,
John Locke has acquired a property interest over the apple.6'
The apple is tangible; however, Locke's dominion and control over the
apple does not depend upon it being tangible. Rather, Locke's dominion
and control depend on his ability to exclude others from using the apple.
This ability to exclude others is an inherent element of property rights.62
DICTIONARY 1494 (8th ed. 2004).

55. See Pierson,3 Cai. R. at 178.
56. See id.
57. See Ghen, 8 F. at 160-6 1.
58. See Ohio Oil Co., 177 U.S. at 209.
59. JOHN LOCKE, TWo TREATISES OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 130 (Dent ed. 1966) (1689) ("He
that is nourished by... the apples he gathers from the trees in the wood, has certainly appropriated
them to himself.").
60. See id.
(removing the apple from nature removes it from the commons and "excludes the
common right of other men").
61. See Pierson,3 Cai. R. at 177-78.
62. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (the right to exclude is "one
of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property").
Thomas W. Merrill argues the right to exclude is more than just one of a bundle of sticks, but is
rather the sine qua non of property. Thomas W. Merrill, Propertyandthe Right to Exclude, 77 NEB.
L. REv. 730, 730 (1998).
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When a virtual John Locke picks up a virtual apple, it is less clear
whether he has appropriated it to his virtual self. The nature of virtual
Locke's ability to control and dominate his virtual apple depends first
upon the rules of the virtual world. These rules often make virtual Locke's
interest in the apple subject to the dominion and control of the game staff
and system administrators. These "superusers ' '63 may have the power to
take virtual Locke's apple. They may change virtual Locke's apple into a
virtual acorn. Worse, they may pull the plug on virtual Locke's entire
world, deleting the apple, the acorn, and virtual Locke himself.
Unlike the tangible John Locke, with his tangible apple, the virtual
John Locke lacks the ability to assert dominion and control over his virtual
apple. Virtual Locke's ability to control and dominate the apple is subject
to the supervisor's control. Virtual Locke cannot exclude supervisors from
exercising control or dominion over his apple. This lack of dominion and
control conflicts with the common law rule of property acquisition as
found in Pierson,Ghen, and Ohio Oil Co. Consequently, the common law
of property does not extend to virtual objects in virtual worlds.
IV. CAPTURING FIBER OPTIC FOXES: SHOULD PROPERTY RIGHTS
EXTEND TO VIRTUAL OBJECTS IN VIRTUAL WORLDS?

While the common law of property does not extend to virtual objects
in virtual worlds, new legislation or judicial rulings may extend the rules
of property to virtual objects. Should the common law of property be
extended
to virtual objects? Dr. Richard Bartle, for one, does not believe
64
SO.

When it comes to virtual worlds, Bartle is an innovator and leader in
the field. Bartle, along with a friend, created the program MUD.65 MUD
stands for Multi-User Dungeon. 66 MUD is considered by many to be the

63. Superusers are just what their name implies: super users (or, superiorly-situated users).
In a computer system, including a virtual game, there are regular accounts and non-regular
accounts. Those non-regular accounts with greater access and powers than regular accounts are
called "superusers." For instance, "[o]n a UNIX system, the superuser is a privileged account with
unrestricted access to all files and commands." /ELEEN FRISCH, ESSENTIAL SYSTEM
ADMINISTRATION 5 (2d. ed. 1995). In a virtual world, such a superuser may be able to add or delete
accounts, items, monsters, and characters.
64. Richard Bartle, Virtual Worldliness: What the ImaginaryAsks ofthe Real, 49 N.Y. LAW
SCHOOL L. REV. 19, 37 (2004).
65. Id.at 20.
66. Id.
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first virtual world.67 All virtual worlds owe a great deal to MUD, both in
design and concept.68
Bartle has written extensively on the subject of virtual worlds.69 As a
pioneer and game developer, he has a unique perspective on the creation,
running, and maintenance of virtual worlds. He argues that virtual worlds
should be allowed to choose whether or not they will become
commodified.7 ° Bartle fears legal regulation will lead to virtual world
commodification. 7'
To Bartle, virtual worlds have three fundamental characteristics: the
game conceit,72 the freedom to evolve,73 and the support of the hero's
journey.74 Commodification's greatest danger is its ability to breach the
game conceit." Bartle argues that "[c]ommodification brings reality into
virtuality."76 He explains that "the game conceit evaporates upon contact
with this much reality."77
Forced commodification removes the ability of developers to protect
the game conceit. This, in turn, harms the ability of the virtual world to
67. For more on the history of MUD, see Summary MUD History,
http://www.livingintemet.com/d/di-major.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
68. Keith Stuart, MUD, PLA TO andtheDawnofMMORPGs, THE GUARDIAN, July 19,2007,
http://blogs.guardian.co.uk/games/archives/2007/07/19/mud_plato and-the-dawn-of mmorpgs.
html ("The thing is, though, that even if the likes of Oubliette did count as a virtual world, they had
pretty well zero effect on the development of today's virtual worlds. Follow the audit trail back
from World of Warcraft, and you wind up at MUD.").
69. See, e.g., Richard Bartle, Out of this World, FINANCIAL WORLD (July 2006),
https://www.financialworld.co.uk/Archive/2006/2006 07jul/Features/virtual economies/virtual_
worlds/7024-print.cfin; Richard Bartle, Pitfalls of Virtual Property (The Themis Group, White
Paper, 2004), available at http://mud.co.uk/richard/povp.pdf; RICHARD BARTLE, DESIGNING
VIRTUAL WORLDS (2003); Richard Bartle, Bad Ideas for Multiplayer Games, THE CURSOR, at 1011, Summer & Fall 1998, available at http://www.mud.co.uk/richard/tesf98.htm. Bartle's
curriculum vitae may be found at http://mud.co.uk/richard/cv.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
70. Bartle, supra note 64, at 43.
71. Seeid.at33-39.
72. A conceit is "an organizing theme or concept." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 257 (1 lth ed. 2003). Bartle uses conceit in this manner. In the game conceit, "some
freedoms must be willingly given up for a time in order that new freedoms can be experienced
during that time." Bartle, supra note 64, at 23.
73. Unlike most game worlds, "[v]irtual worlds are continually evolving." Bartle, supranote
64, at 27. Virtual worlds unable to change will become "stale, dated, dominated by exploits and...
[their] gameplay... [will] become completely disjointed." Id.
74. The hero's journey allows users to "explore their identity." Bartle, supra note 64, at 30.
For more discussion on the hero's journey, see id.at 30 n.29 (citing JOSEPH CAMPBELL, THE HERO
WITH A THOUSAND FACES (1949)).
75. Bartle, supra note 64, at 35.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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evolve. It would be difficult for new content to be added if a developer's
choices were subject to property interests.78 If it is difficult for a virtual
world to evolve, it will also be difficult for the world to support a hero's
journey. Players will be unable to explore their identities in the virtual
world if the world is unable to expand and create new content.
Bartle believes the loss of a developer's freedom to protect these three
characteristics will result in the "end of virtual worlds as we know them
(and, worse, as we might yet have known them)."79 Commodification is
not itself the problem."0 Rather, forced commodification through legal
regulation is the danger.8 ' However, not everybody shares Bartle's fear of
commodification.
Professor Joshua A.T. Fairfield believes virtual property "that is
designed to act like real world property should be regulated and protected
like real world property."82 Fairfield contends that some virtual property
is rivalrous, persistent, and interconnected in nature.83 He argues this kind
of virtual property shares the essential characteristics of real world
property." Since these kinds of virtual property share the legally relevant
characteristics of real world property, he argues that "the common law of
property [is] an obvious possible source of law for these resources."85
However, virtual objects in virtual worlds are neither rivalrous,
persistent, nor interconnected. Fairfield's arguments depend on virtual
property possessing these three characteristics.86 Since virtual objects in
virtual worlds do not possess these characteristics, the common law of
property is not the obvious source of law for virtual objects in virtual
worlds.
Rivalrousness requires the ability of a property owner to own and
control the property to the exclusion of others. 87 Fairfield provides URLs88
and email addresses as examples of virtual properties possessing rivalrous
characteristics.89 However, you do not have the inherent ability to own or
78. See id. at 27-28.
79. Id.at 43.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Virtual Property,85 B.U. L. REv. 1047, 1048 (2005).
83. Id.at 1053.
84. Id.
85. Id.at 1064.
86. See id.
at 1053.
87. See id.
at 1049 n.3.
88. URL stands for Uniform Resource Locator. URLs are website addresses, such as
www.google.com or www.microsoft.com. DOuGLAS DOWNING ET AL., DICTIONARY OF COMPUTER
AND INTERNET TERMs 488 (6th ed. 1998).
89. Fairfield, supranote 82, at 1054.
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control your URLs or email addresses.9" It is the terms of service agreed
to by you, the user, and the company providing the email account or URL
that creates the ability to control these resources. 9' Through these
contractual rights you gain the ability to exclude others from controlling
resources.
Unlike the users of URLs and email addresses, users of virtual worlds
are not provided the right to exclude others from using their virtual objects
through contract. Superusers in virtual worlds can exert dominion and
control over the virtual objects possessed by other users in the virtual
world. In fact, most of the end user license agreements and terms of
service contracts for these virtual worlds explicitly deny any property
rights in virtual objects found in the virtual world.92
Emails are also used by Fairfield as an example of virtual property
possessing the persistence characteristic.93 He focuses on code that "does
not fade after each use, and ... does not run on one single computer. '
Emails, he says, do not cease to exist "[w]hen an email account owner
turns her laptop off."95 Here, Fairfield appears to misunderstand how email
systems work.
Fairfield is correct that in many modem email systems the messages do
not disappear when an account owner turns off their laptop. Google's
Gmail service is an example of one such email system.96 However, the
code for these services runs only on Google's Gmail system, and the
persistence it provides is illusory.97
90. For instance, Google expressly retains all proprietary rights in the services it provides,
such as Gmail email, and further expressly warns that the service may not be accurate, reliable, free
from error, uninterrupted, or secure. Google Terms of Service, http://www.google.com/accounts/
TOS?hl=en (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
91. Google allows a user certain rights in using its services. For example, Google's Terms
of Service expressly states that Google will not claim any intellectual property rights over content
submitted to Google's services by a user. Conversely, the user must agree to allow Google to use
the content in limited ways (such as improving its searches or placing ads in Gmail). This is part
of the contractual bargain between the user and Google. See Google Terms of Service, supranote
90.
92. See World of Warcraft Terms of Use (TOU) 4, http://www.worldofwarcraft.com/
legal/termsofuse.html (last visited Mar. 30,2009) (claiming all rights and title in World of Warcraft
accounts and virtual objects as the property of Blizzard Entm't, the game's creator); but see Second
Life Terms of Service 3.2, http://secondlife.con/corporate/tos.php (last visited Mar. 20, 2009)
(providing as follows: "[y]ou retain copyright and other intellectual property rights with respect to
Content you create in Second Life, to the extent that you have such rights under applicable law.").
93. Fairfield, supra note 82, at 1054
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Google's Gmail, http://www.gmail.com (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
97. "Code," as used here, is another word for computer software. Computer software is
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Google's Gmail system runs on Google's email servers. It does not run
on the account owner's laptop. The account owner is merely accessing
Google's email servers while using the Gmail service. The Gmail account
may be accessible from multiple computers, but the account code is only
being run on the Gmail server infrastructure. There is a fundamental
difference between running code on your computer, with your hardware
and your Internet connection, versus accessing another person's computer
to run code that uses their hardware and their Internet connection.
Still, Fairfield correctly points out that current technology allows email
accounts, such as Gmail, to possess a greater amount of persistence.98
Computer storage technology allows more and more digital information
to be stored. The storage of this information is more and more reliable.
Digital information, however, is impermanent in nature.
Despite the best efforts by information technology specialists, the loss
of digital information continues unabated. Email backups have been lost
to power failures and hardware failures.99 Of particular note here, virtual
worlds have, on occasion, been rolled back to previous states of existence
as a result of bugs in software code. 10 These rollbacks necessarily result
in the loss of acquired virtual objects.'°'

nothing more than computer code executed by a computer.
98. Fairfield, supranote 82, at 1054.
99. See Evan Hansen, HotmaillncineratesCustomerFiles, CNETNEwS.COM, June 3, 2004,
http://www.news.com/Hotmaii-incinerates-customer-files/2100-1038_3-5226090.html (reporting
on problems with lost emails on Microsoft's popular Hotmail service); Michael Arrington, Gmail
Disaster:Reports of Mass EmailDeletions,TECHCRUNCH, Dec. 28,2006, http://www.techcrunch.
com/2006/12/28/gmail-disaster-reports-of-mass-email-deletions (detailing reports of lost emails on
Google's popular Gmail service).
100. Game companies do not publicize problems such as rollbacks. Consequently, only
anecdotal evidence gleaned from posts made by the users of these games can be provided. The
author has personally experienced rollbacks in Ultima Online and World of Warcraft. For anecdotal
stories from other users, see posting of hagrin, Re: Fun game While It Lasted., to Slashdot.org,
http://games.slashdot.org/comments.pl?sid=156322& cid=13104679 (July 19, 2005, 12:47 EST)
(reply to Slashdot article titled Worldof Warcraft DupingBug Found,Slashdot.org, July 19,2005,
http://games.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=05/07/19/1644250&from=rss) (mentioning virtual world
rollbacks in Asheron's Call,EverQuest (EQ), and Ultima Online (UO) "of up to 3 days worth of
gameplay"); and posting of Kinka, Server Rollback. Deleted Badges. No restore?!, to World of
Warcraft Forums, http://forums.worldofwarcraft.com/thread.html?topicld=3168511546&sid=l
(Nov. 30, 2007, 15:11 EST). The developers of Second Life posted a "Post-Mortem" of the
deployment of new server code, including rollbacks. Second Life 1.18.5 Server Deploy PostMortem, Second Life Blogs, http://blogs.secondlife.com/community/features/blog/2007/l 1/13/
second-life- 185-server-deploy-post-mortem (Nov. 13, 2007, 19:27 EST).
101. See Kinka, supranote 100.
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Interconnectivity is another characteristic lacking in virtual objects.
Virtual objects may appear to possess the characteristic of
interconnectivity at first glance. After all, people connect to virtual worlds
using the Internet, which is an interconnected collection of computers. 2
Still, there are significant limits to the interconnected nature of virtual
objects.
The interconnectedness of a virtual object is highly dependent upon its
virtual world. People in EVE Online cannot use the virtual weapons of
World of Warcraft. Someone in EverQuest cannot use the virtual real
estate in Second Life.'0 3 Further, someone using an older computer, or a
computer using an unsupported operating system, may not be able to
experience virtual objects because they are unable to access the virtual
world. °
Virtual objects in virtual worlds are neither rivalrous, persistent, nor
interconnected. The common law of property is, thus, not well-suited to
the peculiarities of virtual objects in virtual worlds. Because of this, courts
and legislatures should not extend the common law of property to protect
virtual objects.
V. CONVERTING FoxEs: PROBLEMS APPLYING PROPERTY LAWS TO
VIRTUAL WORLDS

An examination of likely scenarios reveals the inherent problems with
extending common law rules of property to virtual worlds. Each test case
below is designed to simulate a genuine virtual world experience. These
test cases are examined using the two types of property protections most
likely to be applicable in a virtual world setting: trespass to chattel and the
law of conversion.

102. DOWNING ET AL., supra note 88, at 239-40.
103. EVE Online and EverQuest are virtual fantasy worlds. See EVE Online,
http://www.eveonline.com (last visited Mar. 30,2009); EverQuest, http://www.everquest.com (last
visited Mar. 30, 2009); EverQuest II, http://www.everquest2.com (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
104. The hardware requirements for accessing the World Wide Web are significantly less than
the requirements for accessing most virtual worlds. Compare Mozilla Firefox 2 Web Browser
System Requirements, http://www.mozilla.com/en-US/firefox/system-requirements-v2.html (last
visited Mar. 30, 2009), with World of Warcrafi System Requirements, http://www.
worldofwarcraft.com/info/faq/technology.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2009), EVE Online System
Requirements, http://www.eve-online.com/faq/faq_07.asp (last visited Mar. 30,2009), and Second
Life System Requirements, http://secondlife.com/corporate/sysreqs.php (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
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Trespass to chattel involves the intentional interference with another's
personal property.'15 Descended from the writ trespass de bonis
asportatis,10 6 this tort involves all interferences with personal
propertyl° 7-from complete destruction,' 08 to mere damage,"° to use
without permission.'"
The law of conversion, descended from the law of trover,"' differs
from trespass to chattel in one important aspect. Conversion results in the
compulsory purchase of the property item in question." 2 This means that
in a conversion case, when the property is available, the original owner
does not have to take it back.'13 Rather, the owner can force the person
who took the property to pay its full value." 4 This compulsory purchase
also limits the scope of conversion. A claim of conversion will not exist
for the mere alteration of property;" 5 rather, the alteration must be
material.11 6
Below, these common law principles are applied to virtual world
scenarios.
A. Weapon Attribute Changes
An account holder's character defeats a mighty monster. The character
gains a magical sword as a reward. This sword has specific attributes that
make the sword the most powerful weapon in the game. This new-found
power shifts the balance of power against other players. The effects of the
sword's attributes are tweaked because of this, making the sword less
effective.'
105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 217, 222 (1965).
106. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 14 (5th ed. 1984).
107. See id.
108. Brittain v. McKay, 23 N.C. 265 1 Ired. 265 (N.C. 1840) (holding that severing a corn
crop from the stalks to prevent purchaser from taking possession is a trespass to purchaser's
chattel).
109. Post v. Munn, 4 N.J.L. 61, 1 Southard 61, (N.J. 1818) (damaging a fishing net is a
trespass to chattel).
110. See Penfolds Wines Pty. Ltd. v. Elliot (1946) 74 C.L.R. 204 (Austl.), available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/highct/74clr204.html (Australian case stating that the
unauthorized use of a chattel is a trespass).
111. KEETON ET AL., supra note 106, § 15 (trover often concerned cases where "the finder of
lost goods did not return them, but used them himself").
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. (citing Simmons v. Lillystone, (1853) 155 Eng. Rep. 1417 (U.K.)).
116. Id.
117. World of Warcraft provides a "changelog" listing all of the changes made in each patch,
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If the common law of property is extended to this virtual sword, these
tweaks have altered the user's property, or chattel. Both trespass to chattel
and conversion may apply here.' The question is whether the change
materially altered the user's property." 9 Either way, the game's creator
the loss in value of the sword, or for the entire
may be liable for either
20
1
sword.
the
of
value
This level of protection restrains the ability of the creators of a virtual
world to seek balance. Whereas the user's powerful sword might keep its
power, unintentional side effects of the sword's attributes might render
another player, or an entire class of players, powerless against the user's
sword. The harm this restraint produces for the virtual world, and for other
users of the world, is greater than the benefit this type of property
protection grants the individual user.
B. CharacterAttribute Changes
Sometimes it is more than the attributes of an item that are changed in
order to rebalance a virtual world. Character attributes' 2' may be changed22
in order to redress an unbalancing and unintentional effect in a game.
When an account holder's character is changed, and the character now
behaves in a different way, what kind of recourse would property law
provide in this instance?
Assuming property laws are extended to protect characters in a virtual
2
world, once again the laws of trespass to chattel and conversion apply.1 1
Whether conversion is the appropriate remedy depends on whether the
change was material in nature. 24 Regardless, as in the previous example,

or update, of the game. Item changes are included in this changelog. See Current Patch Notes,
http://www.worldofwarcraft.com/patchnotes/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2008).
118. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 106, §§ 14, 15.
119. See id. § 15 (conversion requires substantial damage resulting in a material change).
120. See id. §§ 14, 15.
121. Character attributes are nearly a term of art in roleplaying games and virtual worlds.
Mechwarrior Ist Edition described character attributes as "a number representing a character's
relative development in four physical and mental areas: Body (Body), Dexterity (DEX), Leaming
Ability (LRN), and Charisma (CHA)." MECHWARROR: THE BATrLETECH ROLEPLAYING GAME 9
(L. Ross Babcock III, 1st ed. 1986). Character attributes are often used as base numbers to
determine relative skill in different areas. See id. at 9-11.
122. Changelogs, or patch notes, often include descriptions of changes to character or class
attributes. See Current Patch Notes, supra note 117.
123. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 106, §§ 14, 15.
124. Id. § 15.
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there is a possibility of the game's creators being liable for altering the
world and devaluing a user's character.' 25
C. Accidental Item or CharacterDeletions
Accidental deletions of accounts or items occur.'26 These can occur
through server failure or server rollbacks.'27 Virtual objects are
impermanent and subject to software, hardware, and administrative
failures. If property law protections are extended to accounts and account
items in a virtual world, accidental 1deletions
will result in a claim for
28
chattel.
to
trespass
for
or
conversion
It is important to note here that in a claim for conversion, the party held
liable must pay the value of the lost item.129 So in this test case, a user may
seek the monetary value of any items or characters he lost even though the
company may be willing to reinstate a character with similar attributes and
items. After all, conversion allows a plaintiff to force the defendant to buy
their lost or materially damaged property.'30 This leaves the company who
created the game with potential monetary liability, regardless of whether
they are willing to restore the account to its previous state.
D. HackedAccounts
Judicial action may be applicable for accounts that are hacked,
particularly where the owner used safe practices in servicing his
account. 13' Accounts may be hacked by malicious software bugs and other
illicit methods that circumvent security procedures. 3 2 Items are often
transferred from the hacked account to another account in these
circumstances. 133 In some cases, the characters themselves
are transferred
' 34
to a new account - essentially being "stolen."'
Conversion and trespass to chattel also apply here. This situation is one
of the most emotional experiences faced by an account owner. The identity
125. See generally id. §§ 14, 15.
126. See, e.g., supranotes 99-100.
127. Id.
128. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 106, § § 14, 15.
129. Id.§ 15.
130. See id.
131. See Daniel Terdiman, No End in Sight to Hackingof'Wo W'Accounts, CNETNEWS.COM,
Apr. 10, 2007, http://www.news.com/No-end-in-sight-to-hacking-of-WoW-accounts/2100-1043_36174704.html.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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built by the owner through playing his characters over many hours has
been stolen. A lack of property laws protecting virtual objects in virtual
often prevents
worlds and the accounts people use to access these worlds135
police from being able to investigate and prosecute cases.
Problems arise, however, in applying property protections even in these
traumatic cases. The liable party here is the person who hacked the
account.'36 Hackers of this type are, by their very nature, illicit actors. This
type of person is difficult to track. While it would be satisfying to be able
to sue a thief for conversion, the likelihood of it occurring is remote.
Therefore, conversion and trespass to chattels are not reliable remedies for
hacked accounts. Since these remedies are unreliable, no benefit will be
gained by extending property protections to virtual objects in order to
provide these remedies.
E. Conversion Through Conversion
Virtual world creators will suffer conversion through conversion from
the extension of the common law of property to virtual objects. Each of the
test cases above result in issues arising from the lack of control the account
holder truly has over his account, his characters, and their items. In order
to extend property laws to virtual objects, account holder control over
these objects will necessarily have to be expanded at the expense of the
virtual world's creators.
Limitations may be placed upon a virtual world creator's ability to
modify accounts once an account holder gains a property right to his
character. Creators will also face limitations on their ability to modify the
game world itself- losing the ability to change user weapons, equipment,
and buildings. The creator may also be required to expend hardware
resources in order to avoid trespassing upon an account holder's rights.
This expansion will effectively subsume, or convert, the tangible and
intellectual property owned by the virtual world's creator into a newly
created commons.137 Conversion through conversion is the way that the
135. According to Blizzard's Terms of Use, an account holder owns no property right in his
account, the account's characters, or the characters' items. Therefore, an account holder cannot
bring a theft charge. See World of Warcraft Terms of Use (TOU), supranote 92, 4, 7 (paragraph
4 claims all rights and title in World of Warcraft accounts and virtual objects as the property of
Blizzard Entm't, the game's creator; paragraph 7 also claims all rights and property interests in a
World of Warcraft account are owned by Blizzard Entm't).
136. See generallyKEETON ETAL., supranote 106, §§ 14, 15 (liability rests with the individual
who intentionally interfered with another's chattel).
137. Virtual commons means virtual space that is owned by one person, here the virtual
world's creator, but is subject to the rights of use of another, the account holder. See BLACKS LAW
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property laws of conversion and trespass to chattel will reduce the ability
of a virtual world's creator to control his property. The reduction results
in the creator's property functioning as a virtual commons.'38
An extension of property law into virtual worlds may reach back into
the tangible world, dragging tangible property, as well as federally
protected intellectual property, into a virtual commons. Control of the
hardware and software composing these virtual worlds is co-opted by the
property interests of the individual users. This destroys the game conceit'39
and destroys the property interests of the game's creator.
VI. TAMING FIBER OPTIc FOXES: CONTRACT LAW AND
VIRTUAL OBJECTS

Value can attach to something whether or not we choose to call it
property. Grey markets exist selling virtual world currency, items, and
characters. These markets have created value from non-property items.
Where there is value, there is also an instinct to protect the value.
However, extending property law protections to these items injects
tangible property into a virtual commons. Consequently, the law of
contract may best serve these speculative markets.
Virtual items sold on these grey markets are the essence of speculation.
Many games do not extend property rights to users for their game
currency, characters, or items. "4The value created by these grey markets
arises from a contractual promise between the seller and buyer to transfer
the item.
This contractual value is based on the promise itself. No property
exchanges hands since neither party possesses or owns the items in
question. This is akin to buying a quitclaim deed for a bridge in Brooklyn
- you'd have more rights to the title of the bridge than the seller of the
quitclaim, but the seller had no such rights to begin with. Still, in these
markets, value attaches to the promise itself, not to the item. This value is
DICTIONARY, supra note 54, at 291 ("common ... 1. [a] legal right to use another person's
property, such as an easement.... ; 2. [a] tract of land set aside for the general public's use.").
138. The problems with commons are famously described in Garrett Hardin's essay, The
Tragedy ofthe Commons. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy ofthe Commons, 162 SCIENCE
1243 (1968).
139. Bartle, supra note 64, at 35 ("the game conceit evaporates upon contact with ...

reality.").
140. See World of Warcraft Terms ofUse (TOU), supranote 92 (paragraph 4 claims all rights
and title in World of Warcraft accounts and virtual objects as the property of Blizzard Entm't, the
game's creator; paragraph 7 also claims all rights and property interests in a World of Warcraft
account are owned by Blizzard Entm't).
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the essence of contract law; no property exchanges hands, for no property
is possessed, but there is an exchange of promises and a contractual
remedy if those promises are breached.
A. ContractLaw Versus PropertyLaw Generally
The Restatement Second of Contracts defines a contract as a "promise
or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the
performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty."'' In
contrast, the introductory note to the Restatement of Property narrowly
confines its discussion to the "legal relations between persons with respect
to a thing."' 42 Central to property is the tangible object, or thing.'43 Central
to contract law is the exchange of promises.144
Access to virtual worlds is granted through the purchase and
maintenance of a user account.'45 This account is an exchange of promises
between the user and the company running the virtual world. The user
agrees to pay the company for his access. In turn, the company promises
to grant him access.
This is a commitment between the user and the company for future
behavior.'46 In a virtual world, virtual objects rely upon future
commitments by the world's creator to maintain the servers, fix broken
code, and ensure access is granted to accounts. In contrast, the tangible
world does not rely or depend upon a future commitment to maintain
Locke's apple or acorn.
B. Obligation Versus Ownership
Obligation is not the same as ownership. The commitment between the
user and the company running a virtual world creates obligations.' 47 The
user is obliged to pay the company for access to the virtual world. Upon
receiving payment, the company is obliged to grant the user access to the
virtual world. This exchange of promises does not create a property
interest in the virtual world. The user does not own the account nor the

141.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981).
142. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 1 Introductory Note (1936).

143. See id.
144. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981).

145. See World of Warcrafi Terms of Use (TOU), supranote 92.
146. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 1.1 (4th ed. 2004).

147. An obligation is a "legal or moral duty to do or not do something." BLACKS LAW
DICTIONARY, supranote 54, at 1104. The user's duty is to pay for access to the virtual world. The
company's duty is to provide access once the user has paid.
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access accompanying it, but rather the company is obliged to grant him the
account and its access through the promissory exchange.
A simple example can help explain the distinction. Parker loans Smith
money. Smith, a debtor, defaults on the debt. Parker's claim for the debt
is founded in contract law as a promissory exchange.'48 One common
misconception is that the claim arises out of the creditor's property. 49 At
the heart of this misconception is the legally incorrect notion that Parker
is due his money, the money he loaned Smith. In fact, Parker is due the
money he is owed; it is not his money, for he does not possess it or control
it. The debt is merely a promise of repayment. Similarly, when Parker
deposits money in a bank, he may incorrectly refer to this money as "my
money," rather than as the bank's obligation to him. 5 °
Blurring the subtle boundaries between obligation and ownership is a
common error.'51 This error creates a misconception of obligation,
equating it with ownership rather than a duty imposed by a contractual
promise.'52 Fairfield's arguments concerning whether virtual objects
should be afforded common law property protections is an example of this
error.
Fairfield approaches virtual objects as though they are tangible.'
Because of the increased persistence, security, and similarities of virtual
objects to tangible objects, Fairfield argues that the common law of
property should be used to provide consumers protection.' In regards to
contract law, Fairfield argues that property law will reduce the frustration
cost of third parties who must search for information about contracts
between two parties. 55
The reality of virtual objects is glossed over by Fairfield. Virtual
objects depend upon an exchange of promises for maintenance. Each
virtual world account requires maintenance independent of another user's
148. FARNSWORTH, supranote 146, § 1.1 (the law of contracts is "concerned primarily with
exchanges because ...courts have generally been unwilling to enforce a promise unless the
promisee has given the promisor something in return for it") (alterations in original).
149. Id.§ 1.3 ("[iut has even been suggested that a breach by the debtor is regarded as a wrong
with respect to the creditor's property, that the ...

claim is founded ...

on what the creditor

owns.").
150. See id; see also FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 31
(A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997) (1936) (a "vast gulf..., to our
minds divides the 'Give me what I own' and 'Give me what I am owed'); see FARNSWORTh, supra
note 146, § 1.3.
151. See id.
152. See id.§ 1.3.
153. Fairfield, supranote 82, at 1049-50.
154. See id. at 1048-1052.
155. See id.
at 1052.
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account. The willing acceptance of these maintenance obligations through
contract allows virtual worlds and objects to function and flourish as they
do.
In addition, exclusionary issues are moot since a virtual object, or a
virtual world, can be accessed simultaneously by many people. This nonexclusivity removes the frustration cost Fairfield is concerned about. To
use Fairfield's own illustration, 56 a virtual watch may be used by multiple
people at the same time and to the exclusion of no one.
The user of a virtual world does not possess or control a virtual object
any more than Parker possessed or controlled the money he loaned
Smith.' 57 Similarly, a Gmail user does not possess or control his Gmail
account.' 58 Rather, Google possesses and controls the account by virtue of
owning the hardware and software running the account, as well as paying
for the Internet connections that allow Google's server to communicate
with the user. While the email user may have certain rights to his account,
the obligations Google accepted as to the account should not be confused
with an ownership interest.
C. Contract Law as the Most Efficient Allocator of Resources
Extending property law to virtual objects creates a conversion through
conversion.' 59 Property law protections will result in the property of a
virtual world's creator entering the commons. This creates a maintenance
burden upon the virtual world's creator. Accordingly, while the interests
of the account holder - or consumer - have increased protections, the
interests of the owners of actual, tangible property - the virtual world's
creators - have become subject to the commons.
In contrast, contract law efficiently allocates resources used in virtual
worlds. First, a conversion through conversion does not necessarily occur
through a contractual relationship. 16 ° In other words, the computers
running the virtual world, the network connections linking it to the
Internet, and the intellectual property associated with it are not injected
into a virtual commons.
156. See id.
157. Supra Part IV.
158. Paragraph 9 of the Gmail Terms of Service vests "all legal right, title and interest in and
to the Services" with Google. Google Terms of Service, supra note 90.
159. Supra Part V.E.
160. This does not remove the possibility of conversion through conversion, but merely
removes the necessity. Voluntary subjection to a commons may occur through contractual
agreements, but it is not forced through property protections. See Second Life Terms of Service,
supra note 92, 3.2.
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At the same time, virtual world creators may choose to subject
themselves to a commons through contractual terms. This choice
illustrates a second reason why contract law is the most sufficient allocator
of resources in a virtual world setting. Freedom to contract is a vital part
of a free market economy.' 61 A virtual world creator's ability to determine
the extent and scope of its users' in-world property rights - a significant
business decision which presumptively incorporates the operations of its
user-consumers and the practices of competing virtual worlds - is an
essential component of this freedom of contract. As Bartle recognized, this
paradigm of voluntary commodification may very well prove
indispensable to the viability of the virtual world industry.' 62
The flexibility granted through contract law allows both the account
holder and virtual world creator to allocate resources efficiently. The
account holder may choose to terminate his account in order to spend the
resources in maintaining it elsewhere. In addition, the virtual world's
creator may choose to grant expansive property rights,163 limited property
rights,"6 or no property rights whatsoever to account holders.' 65
Unlimited horizons are a third reason why contract law more efficiently
allocates the resources of a virtual world than an extension of property law
would allow. Unlike tangible property, virtual worlds and virtual objects
are non-exclusive and non-rivalrous in nature.1 66 Multiple people may
possess the same object. Multiple people may inhabit the same space.

161. Anthony T. Kronman & Richard A. Posner, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW,
Introduction 1-2 (1979) ("[t]he principle that voluntary exchange should be freely permitted in
order to maximize value is frequently summarized in the concept.., of 'freedom of contract."').
162. See Bartle, supranote 64, at 43-44 (describing "uninvited commodification" as "unfair
to those developers and players who do not want it ... self-defeating. . . , [and] ultimately
lead[ing] to its own strangulation").
163. One example is the granting of some form of ownership right in a user's account,
characters, and items possessed by characters in the virtual world. See Second Life Terms of
Service, supra note 92, 3.2 (providing as follows: "[y]ou retain copyright and other intellectual
property rights with respect to Content you create in Second Life, to the extent that you have such
rights under applicable law.").
164. In contrast to expansive rights, the virtual world creator may choose to grant some form
of ownership right solely in the account, allowing the account holder more protection (as compared
to no rights) hacking, theft, or deletion.
165. Granting no rights provides the virtual world's creator the flexibility to alter the world
as necessary without having to consider effects on the rights of account holders. This is the most
common approach. See World of Warcraft Terms of Use (TOU), supranote 92 (paragraph 4 claims
all rights and title in World of Warcraft accounts and virtual objects as the property of Blizzard
Entm't, the game's creator; paragraph 7 also claims all rights and property interests in a World of
Warcraft account are owned by Blizzard Entm't).
166. Supra Part V.
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More significant than exclusivity, however, is the expansive nature of
virtual worlds. While there is certainly an outer-bound for the size of a
virtual world, the nature of the worlds allows more objects and more room
to be added as needed.167 This expansive nature of the virtual world itself,
coupled with the non-exclusivity of virtual objects and virtual space,
creates unlimited horizons. Freedom to contract allows parties to the
contract to efficiently allocate the resources required to sustain these
unlimited horizons in a manner specifically tailored to their unique
situation.
VII. CONCLUSION

Virtual objects in virtual worlds are not rivalrous, persistent, or
interconnected. In addition, the users of virtual worlds are unable to
possess dominion and control over virtual objects. A user's dominion and
control are subject to the dominion and control of the virtual world's
creators. Accordingly, the common law of property should not be extended
to protect rights in virtual objects within virtual worlds.
Extending the common law of property to virtual objects and virtual
worlds deprives those who own the hardware and software running virtual
worlds ofthe right to control their own property. Such an extension results
in conversion through conversion - the property interests of the virtual
world's creator, the hardware and intellectual property supporting the
world, become subject to a new virtual commons. This removes the
freedom of virtual world creators to design worlds of their own
imaginings. In addition, it will have a chilling effect on the creation of new
virtual worlds.
Value in virtual worlds and virtual objects derive from contractual
obligation. This value is based upon promissory exchange rather than
possession or control of any thing, virtual or otherwise, making contract
law the most appropriate source of protections for this value. Contract law
is also the most efficient allocator of resources for the maintenance of
virtual worlds. Freedom to contract between virtual world creators and
users will ensure that resources for maintaining the unlimited horizons
allowed by virtual worlds will be efficiently allocated.
Modem day Posts hunting the creatures of a virtual world like World
of Warcraft face new realities. Where Post never achieved corporeal
possession of the fox he hunted, a virtual Post can be protected by game
mechanics. For instance, in World of Warcraft the question of who can
167. See Bartle, supra note 64, at 27-30 ("[v]irtual worlds are continually evolving.").
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claim the rewards from killing a monster are determined automatically.
The first person or group to damage a monster "tags" the monster and
gains the reward.' 68
These game mechanics are functions of an imaginary, virtual world.
The mechanics could just as easily be different - they are designed at the
whim and desire of a game's developers. The ability to create worlds with
rules different from the real world is a fundamental characteristic of virtual
worlds.'69 The creator of a virtual world may decide to allow Post to have
the fox, or the creator may want Pierson to have the fox. Instead of either
of these solutions, the creator may wish to allow Post and Pierson to fight
over the fox.
Any conceived or yet-to-be conceived solution is available to the
creator, and this is the power of virtual worlds. Regulating virtual worlds
by applying the common law of property will destroy this game conceit, 70
thus destroying one of the fundamentals of virtual worlds. As Bartle
suggested, this will end the power of virtual worlds to provide new
realities, realities that, as of yet, we do not know.'71 Such a loss will be a
true tragedy.

168. World ofWarcraft Monster Basics, http://www.worldofwarcraft.con/info/basics/monster
basics.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2007).
169. See Bartle, supra note 64, at 23.
170. See id. at 35.
171. See id. at 43.

